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Introduction 
One of the perennial problems which has not only defied all past attempts at 
permanent solution, but also has a tendency for evoking high emotions on the part of 
all concerned (each time it is brought forth for discussion or analysis) is the issue of 
equitable revenue allocation in Nigeria. It is an issue which has been politicised by 
successive administrations in Nigeria both Military and civilian regimes. Indeed, in 
virtually all federations in which the constitution shares power between the central and 
regional or state governments and, for each level to be “within a sphere co-ordinate 
and independent” (Wheare 1963:93) enough resources need be allocated to each tier 
to justify their existence.  According to The Federalist, as quoted in Wheare, ‘it is, 
therefore, as necessary that the state governments should be able to command the 
means of supplying their wants as that the national government should possess the like 
faculty in respect to the wants of the union’ (Wheare 1963). Wheare, a doyen of 
federalism added further that “this is clearly an additional problem in public finance to 
those which confront all governments. And it is a very difficult problem. It is not easy to 
distribute functions, and when once they are distributed, it is even harder to allot 
resources with any confidence that future experience will show that resources and 
functions expand or contract together, each adjusting itself harmoniously to the other” 
(Wheare 1963, Elaza 1974:89-92). 
The nature and conditions of the financial relations in federal systems particularly 
one that is transfixed on a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria is crucial to her continuing 
existence (Badmus 1989:7) for fiscal matters transcend the purview of economics 
alone. They have in most cases in Nigeria assumed political, religious and social 
dimensions (Adesina 1998:234). In the words of James O’Connor, allotments of money 
(and resources) must reflect “social and economic conflicts between classes and 
groups” (O’Connor 1993:276). It is not surprising therefore, that the basis of federal 
statutory revenue allocation has always been one of the “most contentious and 
destabilizing factors in the Nigerian polity” (see Nigerian Tribune August 11, 1995:1). 
No doubt, ‘public finance is one of those subjects which lie on the borderline between 
economics and politics’ (Dalton 1929 also cited in Ekeh 1994:234). 
It needs be emphasized that whatever may be the origin of a federation, whether 
aggregation or devolution, its establishment at once raises three salient problems: “how 
to allocate functions rationally; how to allocate taxing powers; and how to share 
revenue between the governments of that federation” (Phillips 1971:389 also cited in 
Adebayo 1990:246). In a front page editorial comment, a national daily – Nigerian 
Tribune - identified five major objectives that revenue allocation formula must 
accomplish via: (i) national unity; (ii) economic growth, (iii) balanced development, (iv) 
self-sufficiency and (v) high standard of living for the citizens (Nigerian Tribune editorial 
comment 11th August, 1995:1). The snag however in Nigerian context is how best to 
resolve these complex revenue allocation problems that will achieve the 
aforementioned objectives. Thus, on several occasions, successive governments have 
been revising revenue allocation formula till date. So far, an acceptable formula is yet 
to be arrived at; in view of the agitations here and there for an acceptable formula 
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coupled with the extreme position of oil producing region calling for total resource 
control if possible. 
Meanwhile, it is imperative to note that Nigeria’s revenue sharing debates have 
revolved basically around three issues namely: (i) the relative proportions of federally 
collected revenues in the federation account that should be assigned to the centre, the 
states, the localities and the so-called ‘Special Funds’ (vertical revenue sharing), (ii) the 
appropriate formulae for the distribution of centrally devolved revenues among the 
states and among the localities i.e. local governments (horizontal revenue sharing) and 
(iii) the percentage of federally collected mineral revenue that should be returned to the 
oil-bearing states and communities on the account of the principle of derivation and 
compensation for the ecological risks of oil production (Suberu 1995:8-9). It is equally 
important to note that since the oil boom in the early 1970s, the revenue allocation 
formula has been bedeviled by time inconsistencies – a tendency of one of the parties 
in a consensual agreement to change the terms after the negotiations have been 
completed. The formula has been continually manipulated in the service of inter-
regional and inter-ethnic cross-subsidization (Olopoenia 1998:51). 
The thrust of this paper therefore is an in-depth analysis of the politics of revenue 
allocation formula and resource control vis-à-vis the country’s bid to attain national 
integration. Following this introductory remarks, which forms the first part, the paper 
continues in part two with a short theoretical postulation bothering on federalism and 
revenue allocation principles. Part three is on comparative perspective of fiscal 
federalism in a number of federal states and juxtaposing same with Nigeria. Part four 
reviews revenue allocation commission recommendations in Nigeria’s pre-colonial, 
colonial and post-colonial state till date. The fifth part considers the restless Niger Delta 
Region along with its claim and call for derivation principle. This has been well 
discussed taking the future of Nigeria’s federal state into consideration. The final part of 
the paper is on the way forward if Nigeria’s federal state may not go the way of the 
former Soviet Union (USSR) that disintegrated in the early 1990s principally as a result 
of Russian hegemony in virtually all ramifications. 
1. Federalism and revenue allocation formula: a theoretical postulation 
In federal systems of government, revenue allocation involves two schemes. The first is 
the vertical sharing between the federal or inclusive government and the other tiers of 
governments. The subject of these sharing schemes is the federally collected 
revenues. This is because the revenues generated within the jurisdictional areas of the 
units – states and local governments – are not subject to the national sharing formula. 
In the annals of federal countries’ revenue sharing arrangements, the sources of the 
federally collected revenue that form the subject of the sharing formula have remained 
largely unchanged. These sources which are not amenable to other units include 
import duties, mining rents, excise units, export duties and royalties (Ovwasa, 
1995:102-117). The implication of this is that, since these sources of revenue are not 
amenable to the jurisdiction of the other units of government, the problem of revenue 
allocation has focused on not who should raise the taxes, but on how to share the 
proceeds that is, the actual revenue collected by the federal government. The 
imbalance between functions and resources base, calls for higher level government to 
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transfer revenue to the lower level. Graham in a perceptive work, described such 
transfer as “deficiency transfer or balancing” (Graham, 1964). It is so described 
because the transfer seeks to make up for the differences in the levels of functions 
devolved to the lower government and the resources available to it. 
Another principle of revenue transfer which is horizontal revenue sharing arises 
out of the variations in revenue generation capacities of the component units. Where 
the revenue raising capacities are low, heavier tax burden is imposed relative to higher 
revenue raising capacities area. This transfer is called “equalization transfer”. This 
transfer is necessary because higher taxation will scare away businesses and the 
economy of the unit will become more depressed. To avoid this, the higher the federal 
level of government has to transfer to the lower unit, the better, to enable it make up for 
the differences between its internally generated revenue and those required for 
maintaining the minimum standard of services. 
The two types of resource transfer discussed above are known as inter-
governmental grants-in-aid. The third principle has been given different names by 
different scholars. Beak (cited in Graham 1964) called it “simulation”, “incentive” or 
“conditional” grants. This grant is also known as categorical grants because such 
grants are designed basically to undertake certain projects. This is also known as 
categorical grants because they are desired for particular purposes.  
Nevertheless, in view of the fact that no federation has all its component parts 
equally developed, the transfer of funds within a federation is a potent weapon in the 
hands of mangers of the state more so in a plural society with diverse cleavages to 
satisfy hegemonic interests. On the other hand it can help in ensuring that all parts of 
the federation have resources to carry out their functions. The government can thus 
ensure that the revenue from resources located in a part of the country is used for the 
benefit of all parts (Nyemutu-Roberts 2005:328). To this extent, revenue allocations 
can foster national integration. However, when misused, it engenders political 
altercations and contestations which destablise the political economy and tend to 
undermine the efficacy of federalism in fostering political accommodation and 
economic development. This is why the most common source of friction in a federation 
is the distribution of fiscal resources (Aluko 1976:1). It is important to add that fiscal 
relationship in a gamut of intergovernmental relations is no longer only federal-state but 
also state-federal, federal-local and state-local. This is one of the most significant 
recent trends in inter-governmental fiscal relationships in federal systems across all 
regions and climes of the world (Aluko 1976). 
2. Fiscal Federalism: a comparative note 
From one federal state to the other, there are variations based on the conjunction 
of their history, politics and development paradigms. However, one thing that is certain 
is that a fiscal federal system which refuses to be guided by these norms is invariably 
bogged down by persistent and perennial conflicts between the national and 
region/state governments and among the state governments until appropriate changes 
are accommodated or else the polity may fall apart more so where the system is not 
sufficiently resilient (Adebayo 2001:22). 
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In terms of the power to raise revenue, it is important that the assignment of tax 
powers is in that manner as to ensure coordinate independent authority to impose 
taxes and maximize comparative advantage in terms of achieving a high level of 
efficiency for the tax system. As far as possible, tax powers must also be assigned on 
the basis of the principle of separation of powers – exclusively either to the centre or 
the states. For example India’s fiscal federalism is based inter alia on the notion that 
coordinate fiscal power and comparative advantage gives the centre the exclusive 
power to levy taxes on production (excise duty) and non-agricultural income and 
wealth, whereas the states are empowered to levy tax on sale or purchase of goods 
and on agricultural incomes and wealth. The Indian constitution assigns exclusively to 
the Union government functions relating to money supply and external borrowing but 
the power to borrow internally is assigned to both the Union and State governments. 
However, where a state is indebted to the Centre (a state can borrow from the Union 
government), it has to obtain its permission to borrow internally. Thus, Indian States 
have on the whole, significant independent revenue raising powers. They raise about 
35 percent of total revenue which finances 51 percent of their expenditures. 37 percent 
of states expenditure is financed from transfers from the Centre. To affect such transfer 
on an objective basis, provision is made for the appointment of the finance 
commission. 
In Brazil which is another federal State, under its constitution, the federal fiscal 
system has become highly decentralized. The States are assigned a broad-base, high-
yield value added tax with power to set the VAT rates, collect and administer while the 
case of the federal VAT has been limited to industrialized goods. Statutory transfers 
from the Centre have at the same time been increased. Federal excises on fuel, 
electricity, telecommunications and transport have been eliminated. Consequently, like 
India (and indeed like such other large federations such as Australia, Canada, 
Germany and USA), approximately one third of total revenue is raised by the States 
and this finances 54.6 percent of their expenditures. Transfers account for only 31.8 
percent of state governments’ expenditures. In other words, constitutional provisions on 
tax power and revenue sharing are in favour of sub-national (state and local) 
governments. It is also important to note that in Brazil local governments have since 
1988 become important players in fiscal federalism (Adebayo 2001). 
The development of fiscal federalism in Nigeria particularly during the past 
seventeen years vis-à-vis the state tax autonomy has been in the opposite direction. 
Fiscal autonomy derived from coordinate and independent fiscal powers by the centre 
and the states/regions has been lost. While between 1954 and 1966 this used to be 
major principle of fiscal federalism in Nigeria, most of the autonomous tax powers of 
the states have been removed. These include: 
Discontinuation of export duties and sales tax on agricultural produce. 
• Standardization of personal income tax rates throughout the country, 
thereby ensuring that the state governments become powerless to change 
the rates. 
• Introduction of uniform fuel prices throughout the country, thereby 
removing the power of state governments to levy petroleum sales taxes. 
• The take over by the federal military government of all off-shore oil 
royalties and rent and with it the erosion of the principle of derivation 
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principle in fiscal allocation from about 50 percent to less than 10 percent 
before rising to the current level of 13 percent of the distributable pool 
(Adebayo 2001:22). 
The cumulative impact of this erosion of the tax autonomy of the states is that they 
have become excessively dependent on the central authorities. As against the average 
of 31.8 and 35 percent of total national revenue raised by Brazilian and Indian States, 
the Nigerian States are raising a mere 10 percent on the average. Thus, in Nigeria it is 
fiscal unitarism and not fiscal federalism. If fiscal federalism constitutes the essence of 
democratic participation in a federal polity by guaranteeing unity in diversity, imposing 
limits and the size of government and promoting economic efficiency and equity, fiscal 
unitarism imposed through federal government hegemony is a sure source of conflict 
and anti-democratic culture and of resource mismanagement and corruption. Fiscal 
unitarism in a federal polity offers too great an incentive to macro-economic 
mismanagement and instability. It is also an open license for uneconomical 
competitiveness in the provision of public services and public goods (Adebayo 2001). 
In an empirical survey carried out by Bade Onimode with the stratified sample 
survey which covered 14 states in all the six regions/zones of the country as well as the 
Federal Capital Territory of Abuja carried out in 1999 which covered main issues such 
as: 
• whether the present revenue allocation system in the country is 
satisfactory. 
• Preference for alternative sharing of the Distributable Pool Account. 
• Possible allocation of the Distributable Pool to Special Accounts. 
• Support for change of PTF (Petroleum Trust Fund) into a National 
Development Fund. 
• Agreement on 13 percent derivation formula to the oil-producing states. 
• Suggestion on a more appropriate percentage allocation to the derivation 
principle.  
• Opinion on different sources of oil revenue on which to base the derivation 
principle (e.g. on-shore, off-shore, etc.). 
• Relative preference for other principles of revenue allocations. 
• How the local governments should share in revenue from the derivation 
principle. 
• Opinion on the sharing of constitutional jurisdiction over revenue, fiscal, tax 
or other resource powers among the tiers of government. 
• Opinion on the level of government to exercise specific fiscal powers. 
• Suggestion on the sharing of VAT revenue among the tiers of government. 
• Free comments on another aspect of the fiscal system in the country. 
The principal finding of the survey mentioned earlier which was conducted in 1999 
includes the following: 
• 91 percent of the respondents are dissatisfied with the current revenue 
allocation system in the country. 
• 83 percent of the respondents would like to see the share of the states in 
the Distributable Pool Account increase from 24 to 40 percent while that of 
the Federal Government is reduced to 40 from 48 percent. 
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• 84.6 percent of respondents feel that the principle of derivation should 
apply to petroleum profits tax; 72.9 percent want it to apply to on-shore oil 
revenue while 64.8 percent favour off-shore oil revenue. 
• with respect to preferences of national revenue to be allocated according to 
the derivation, all respondents favour a percentage higher than the current 
13 percent support for 30 to 50 percent was the highest. 
• With regard to preferences for horizontal allocation of distributable pool 
accounts among the regions/states more than two-thirds of the 
respondents expressed preferences for the following eight criteria in the 
order of their preferences beginning with the most preferred among these 
two-thirds: 
(i)  Ecological Protection; 
(ii) Population; 
(iii) Basic Needs; 
(iv) Internal Revenue Generation; 
(v) Fiscal Efficiency; 
(vi) Social Development Factor; 
(vii) Population Density; and  
(viii) Equality of access to development (cited extensively in Adebayo 
2001:27). 
Only three of these – (ii), (iv) and (vii) are in the 1999 constitution. Most 
respondents prefer that VAT should become the exclusive responsibility of the 
Regions/States (Adebayo 2001). From the foregoing, we now proceed to a review of 
what obtains to date. 
3. Revenue allocation commissions (1946-1968): a review 
The history of revenue allocation formula and commission all in an attempt to arrive at 
an acceptable sharing formula for Nigeria occurred long before independence. The first 
set of commissions was ad hoc in nature. The first commission ever set up by the 
colonial masters was in 1946. The name of the Commissioner was Phillipson. 
Recommendation of the commission was to take effect from 1948/49. The commission 
placed emphasis on three principles for revenue sharing, derivation, population and 
even progress. This period was characterized by strong federal government’s presence 
in fiscal matters (Olaloku 1979). The newly created regional councils at the time were 
allocated the residue or excess of the budgetary needs of the Central government 
because they had no legislative powers whatsoever. So they could not collect or 
appropriate revenue. 
By 1951, the recommendations of that Commission became unacceptable to 
Nigerians in general and nationalist leaders in particular and another one was set up 
that year known as Hicks Phillipson commission. This commission recommended three 
principles: Derivation, Needs and National Interest. The recommendation of this 
commission was to take effect in 1952/53 (Phillips 1971). It needs be added further that 
the regional councils during this period had the fiscal powers with independent 
revenues and tax jurisdictions with the aim of prompting a truly federal system. The 
Central Government now shared equally with the Regions (East, West and North), the 
Ojo, Revenue Allocation and Resource Control in Nigeria 21 
	  
centrally-collected revenue. The Regional portion of this revenue was in turn shared 
among the Regions largely on the basis of derivation. Mention must be made of the 
introduction of special grants to the Regions to take care of education and police 
protection (Phillips 1971, Omitola 2005:149). The major difference or departure of this 
commission with the previous one’s recommendation is that it de-emphasised 
population criterion. 
In 1953, Chick`s Commission was raised to review the formula again. In its report, 
the commission adopted and emphasised the derivation principle as the basis of 
allocation of revenue to the Regions. For effective application of the derivation 
principle, the following weights were allocated for each region. Eastern and Northern 
Regions each had 30 percent while the Western Region had 40 percent (Omitola 
2005). Still in search of acceptable revenue allocation formula in 1958, Raisman 
Commission was raised to review same. In its own recommendation it reduced 
considerably, the importance of principle of derivation, and retained the principle of 
fiscal autonomy for the Region; it emphasised that of needs with population used as an 
approximate index of fiscal needs and the basic responsibilities of the regional 
governments and the need for even-development of the country which it called “unified 
national policy”. This commission recommended further that the North which had over 
half of the country’s population was to receive 40 percent; Western Region was to 
receive 37 percent, Eastern Region 18 percent and Southern Cameroon 5 percent; 
while the Northern Region in addition received 1.5 million naira as compensation 
because the principle of derivation worked against it in the past. 
Six years later in 1964, Binns Commission did another review. This commission 
was established as a result of a realignment of boundaries. First, with the referendum 
that transferred Southern Cameroons to the Main Cameroon in 1961 and the creation 
of the Mid-Western Region from Western Region in 1963. The Commission’s 
recommendations contained the emphasis on the use of the principle of needs. While 
the federation and the Regions continued to share the federally-collected revenue, the 
commission recommended a change on the formula for sharing the Distributable Pool 
Account (DPA). Northern Region had 42 percent; Eastern Region 30 percent, Western 
Region 20 percent and the Mid-western Region 8 percent. The creation of the twelve-
state structure in 1967 brought about a revision in the revenue sharing formula, with 
the retention of the basic principle of allocation as recommended by the Binns 
Commission. 
In 1968, Dina Committee – an interim system pending the working out of a new 
revenue system following the creation of 12 states – was raised. The committee 
stressed the most urgent problem facing the nation as the gross imbalance in 
economic development among various states of the federation. Thus, it introduced 
minimum responsibility of government as a revenue sharing criterion. While retaining 
the principles of need, even-development and derivation that had been introduced by 
previous commissions, it recommended the establishment of a permanent revenue 
planning and fiscal commission. However, the recommendation of the Dina committee 
was never implemented. Its Report has been regarded not only as one of the best 
documentations on the country’s fiscal system, but also one which was too far ahead of 
its times (see Adesina, 1998 and Omitola, 1995). Below see table 1 for the system of 
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Revenue Allocation to the regions/states of Nigeria since 1948. The table is self-
explanatory. 
At this juncture, it is imperative to make a number of remarks on both the 
commissions and the formula. First, thus far, virtually all the revenue allocation 
formulas are warped because they have not been “open covenants openly arrived at” 
(Omitola, 2005). Rather, they reflect the views of commissions, individuals or groups 
within the commissions, which have shown proclivity for embracing theories, beliefs, 
ideas and approaches which have not only proved unrealistic but have thereby 
contributed to the dislocations within the Nigerian State by the Military 
On December 31, 1983 the Revenue Amendment Decree, Decree no.36 of 1984 
not only retained the use of the horizontal principles introduced by the Okadigbo 
Commission; it also amended the Revenue Allocation Act of 1981 and introduced a 
new revenue allocation formula as follows: 
Federal Government - 55 % 
State Government  - 32.5 % 
Local Government - 10 % 
Special Grants  - 2.5 % (Adebayo 1990) 
The Babangida Administration through Decree no. 49 of 1989 created the 
Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission to oversee revenue sharing 
and mobilization (Obi, 1998). The creation of this commission represented a radical 
departure from the use of Ad Hoc Commissions. It was to examine and make funds in 
the Federation Account allocated as follows: 
 Federal Government - 47% 
 State Government - 30% 
 Local Government - 15% 
 Special Funds  - 8% (Offiong 1997) 
In December 1989, the Federal Government accepted the recommendations of 
the Commission on the modifications of the sharing formula:  
 Federal Government - 50% 
 State Government - 30% 
 Local Government - 15% 
 Special Funds  - 5% 
The formula for sharing among the federating states stood thus: 
 Equality of states  - 40% 
 Population   - 30% 
 Landmass   - 10% 
 Social Development  - 10% 
 Internal Revenue Effort - 10% (Danjuma 1996) 
Another of comments is imperative in the recommendations of this commission. 
First, the revisiting of the principle of derivation as the Commission allocated 2 percent 
of the revenue from mineral exploitation in direct proportion to the rate of mineral 
extracted from each state, and, secondly, 1.5 percent was to be administered by the 
Federal Government for the development of the mineral producing areas of the country 
(West Africa December 24, 1980). As a consequence of the transfer of primary 
education to local government Decree no. 3 of 1991 made a slight amendment to the 
sharing formula thus: 
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  Federal Government - 50% 
  State Government - 25% 
  Local Government - 20% 
  Special Funds  - 5% (Olaloku,1979) 
By June 1992, there was another revision of the revenue allocation formula along 
this line: 
  Federal Government - 48.5% 
  State Government - 24% 
  Local Government - 20% 
  Special Funds  - 7.5% (Omitola, 1995) 
One striking feature of the recommendations of various Revenue Allocation 
Commissions with respect to the revenue allocation formula adopted from the 1970s is 
a phenomenon tagged the “concentration process” in Nigeria’s fiscal federalism 
(Mbanefoh and Egwakihide 1998:22). This refers to situation whereby there is a 
gradual reduction of State Government Accounts and this is further exacerbated with 
the establishment of Special Account by the Federal Government (Mbanefoh, 
Egwakihide 1998). This is because it was used to favour a few selected states/Local 
Councils more often than not, it provoked inter-state hostility and rivalry, thereby 
undermining the stability and corporate existence of the country. For the graphic 
description of vertical allocation of the federation account, between 1981 and 1995, see 
table 1 below. Table 2 also shows Horizontal Revenue Allocation Formulae from 1970-
1995. 
Gen. Sani Abacha’s national Constitutional Conference Committee on revenue 
allocation 
The National Constitutional Conference convened by Gen. Sani Abacha’s 
administration (November 1993-June 1998) established a Committee, after receiving 
various memoranda from different groups and parts of the country. The Committee 
recommended a new sharing formula thus: 
  Federal Government  - 33% 
  State Government  - 22.5% 
  Local Government  - 20% 
  Federal Capital Territory - 1% 
  Stabilization Account  - 5% 
  Economic Development - 2% 
  Derivation   - 11% 
  OMPADEC   - 6% 
 On the horizontal sharing of revenue, the following principles were 
recommended: 
  Equality of States  - 30% 
  Population   - 40% 
  Social Development  - 10% 
  Internal Revenue Effort  - 10% 
  Landmass and Terrain - 10% (News October 3, 1994:15) 
 The commission recommended 13 percent for derivation, the 13 percent was 
lumped with any amount set aside for funding any authority or agency or the 
development of the state or states of derivation. While the recommendations of the 
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constitutional conference were far-reaching inasmuch as they ended to reduce 
considerably the proportion of revenue accruing to the Federal Government, and thus 
enhance fiscal decentralization, they were never implemented. Rather, the 1999 
constitution promulgated by the Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar’s Administration (June 
1998-May 1999) adopted the 1992 Revenue Allocation formula via: 
  Federal Government - 48.5% 
  State Government - 24% 
  Local Government - 20% 
  Special Funds  - 7.5% (Omitola 1995) 
Pursuant to the provisions of the 1999 constitution, the Revenue Mobilization 
Allocation and Fiscal Commission established to “review from time to time, the revenue 
allocation formulae and principles in operation to ensure conformity with changing 
realities” embarked on a review of the existing revenue allocation and recommended a 
new sharing formula: 
  Federal Government - 41.3% 
  State Government - 31.0% 
  Local Government - 10.0% 
  Special funds  - 13.0% 
On the horizontal formula for disbursement of funds amongst states and local 
governments, the Commission recommended thus: 
 i. Equality   - 4.5% 
 ii. Population   - 2.5% 
 iii. Population density  - 2.0% 
 iv. Internal revenue effort   - 8.0% 
 v. Landmass   - 5.0% 
 vi. Terrain   - 5.0% 
 vii. Rural road, water ways  - 1.5% 
 viii. Portable water  - 1.5% 
 ix. Education   - 4.0% 
 x. Health    - 3.0% 
 The Commission recommended that 60 percent of the Derivation Fund be 
allocated to the federating states and 40 percent to the Local Government Councils in 
the oil-producing areas. However, most states especially the Southern states are 
dissatisfied with the revenue allocation formula. This dissatisfaction has to do with what 
they observed as over-concentration of federal revenues in the Federal Government. 
These states also felt that if they have substantial control over resources found in their 
areas of jurisdiction, as it was the practice in the First Republic, more revenues would 
and should be available to them for developmental purposes. Hence, they assert a 
recourse claim to the court of law for judicial interpretation of the provisions of relevant 
sections of the constitution. However, the ruling of the Supreme Court made inevitable 
further adjustments to the above recommendations necessitating a radical change in 
the revenue allocation formula thus: 
  Federal Government - 46.43% 
  State Government - 33.20% 
  Local Government - 20.73% 
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Nonetheless, the Federal Government set aside the recommendations of the 
Revenue Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) while President Olusegun 
Obasanjo issued an Executive order pursuant to section 315 of the 1999 constitution 
pending the approval of a new revenue allocation formula by the National Assembly. 
The Executive order, as was expected, gives the lion share (i.e. 54.68 percent) to the 
Federal Government. While the recommendations of the commission on the revenue 
allocation formula are still awaiting the consideration of the National Assembly, the 
Executive Branch withdrew the Bill, which embodied them, on the excuse that there 
wee in circulation many versions of the Revenue Allocation Bill. 
From the foregoing, a number of comments and observations become imperative. 
As rightly observed by Suberu (1995:4), the subsequent periodic modifications of these 
allocative criteria have achieved three things. First, they have effectively legitimized the 
criteria of demography and equality as the prominent principles of horizontal revenue 
sharing in Nigeria. Second, the periodic changes in the horizontal revenue sharing 
system have largely compounded the schemes intensely political and divisive nature. 
For instance, in 1990, the Babangida Administration re-introduced, and then assigned 
a weight of ten percent to the discredited principles of land mass. Ethno-regional 
opposition to this apparent bias to the North (which with only about half of the nation’s 
population), encompasses some three quarters of the national territory led some 
southern members of the National Constitutional Conference to propose the inclusion 
of the countervailing ‘political’ principle of ‘population density’ in the horizontal revenue 
sharing scheme. The primary effect of such regional political maneuvers is to deprive 
the nation of the development of a coherent revenue sharing scheme that balances 
‘efficiency’ and ‘equity’ principles of allocation in a politically healthy and economically 
productive manner. Third, and finally, Nigeria’s horizontal revenue sharing policies and 
reforms give insufficient recognition to such largely non-political principles of allocation 
as the social development factor and internal revenue generation effort while blatantly 
ignoring such other technical principles as budgetary obligation, absorptive capacity, 
fiscal efficiency and fiscal equalizations. 
The inter-governmental and ethno-regional tensions and suspicious associated 
with vertical and horizontal revenue sharing in Nigeria are poignantly underscored by 
on-going controversies over the sharing of the proceeds of the centrally administered 
Value Added Tax (VAT). Introduced in January 1994 to replace the unsuccessful state-
based sales tax, VAT yielded impressive total revenues of 8.6 and 21 billion naira in 
1994 and 1995 respectively (Business Times December 12, 1994:16). The VAT 
proceeds were originally and statutorily designed to be shared, in the order of 80 
percent to the states and 20 percent to offset the administrative costs of VAT to the 
Federal Government (see Daily Times January 17, 1995:51). In January 1995, 
however, the Federal Government increased its share of VAT proceeds to 50 percent, 
reduced that of the states to 25 percent and assigned the balance to the localities 
(Daily Times, 17th January, 1995:51. Trenchant criticisms of this brazen assault on 
fiscal federalism led General Abacha to announce the following sharing formula for 
VAT in February 1996. Forty percent for the states and the Federal Capital Territory 
(FCT), Abuja, 35 percent to the Federal Government and 25 percent to the localities 
(The Guardian February 18, 1995:18). Yet, an even more perverse feature of the VAT 
regime is the Federal Government’s distortion, politicization and centralization of the 
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inter-state sharing arrangements with the consequence that the returns to the bigger 
contributors to VAT (mainly Lagos and other southern states) are almost inversely 
proportional to their contributions (Daily Times, January 4, 1995 and Nigerian Tribune 
9th October, 1995). 
The following tables below clearly encapsulated revenue allocation formulae in 
both pre and post independence Nigeria. They are self explanatory. 
 
Table 1: System of revenue allocation to the regions/states of Nigeria since 1948 
 
Year of 
Introduction 
Commissioner Principles System of Allocation 
A. 1948/9 Phillipson Derivation 
Even progress 
Not specified 
B. 1952/3 Hicks Phillipson Derivation needs 
National interest 
1. 50% of import duties on 
tobacco, and 100% on 
motor fuel, according to 
consumption. 
2. Capitation grant: 13s per 
head. 
3. 100% education and po-
lice grants. 
4. Special equalizing grants. 
C. 1954/5 Chick Derivation 
Fiscal autonomy 
1. 50% of import and excise 
duties on tobacco, and 
100% of import duties on 
motor fuel, according to 
consumption. 
2. 50% of other import du-
ties (other than on alco-
hol, tobacco, and motor 
fuel) to be distributed: 
East 30%; West 40%; 
North 30%. 
3. 100% of income tax (ex-
cept on companies), ac-
cording to residence. 
4. 100% mining, rents and 
royalties, according to ex-
traction. 
5. 50% export duties, ac-
cording to origin. 
D. 1959/60 Raisman Tress Derivation 
Fiscal autonomy 
Unified national 
policy 
1. 100% of import and ex-
cise duties on tobacco, 
and 100% of import du-
ties on motor fuel, ac-
cording to consumption. 
2. 100% export duties, ac-
cording to origin. 
3. 50% mining rents and 
royalties, according to ex-
traction. 
4. 30% of other import du-
Ojo, Revenue Allocation and Resource Control in Nigeria 27 
	  
ties (other than on alco-
hol, tobacco, and motor 
fuel), and 30% of mining 
rents and royalties, to be 
paid into the Distributable 
Pool Account: North, 
40/95; West, 24/95; East, 
31/95. 
E. 1966/7 Binns Derivation 
Fiscal autonomy 
Unified national 
policy. 
1. 100% of import and ex-
cise duties on tobacco 
and motor fuel, according 
to consumption. 
2. 100% export duties, ac-
cording to origin. 
3. 50% mining rents and 
royalties, according to ex-
traction. 
4. 35% of other import du-
ties, and 35% of mining 
rents and royalties, to be 
paid into the Distributable 
Pool Account: East, 30%; 
West, 20%; Mid-west, 
8%; North, 42%. 
F. 1968/9 An interim 
system pending 
the working out 
of a new 
revenue system 
following the 
creation of 12 
States. 
 As Above, Except That The 
Pool Account Is To Be 
Distributed As Follows: Each 
Of The Six Northern States 
(Kano, North-Western, 
North-Central, North-
Eastern, Kwara, Benue-
Plateau), 7%; Western, 18%; 
Lagos, 2%; Mid-Western, 
8%; East-Central, 17.5%; 
South-Eastern, 7.5%; Rivers, 
5%. 
G. 1969/70 Also an interim 
system pending 
a new 
constitution. 
 1. 100% of import and ex-
cise duties on motor fuel, 
and 100% of excise duty 
on tobacco, according to 
consumption. 
2. 60% export duties, ac-
cording to origin. 
3. 45% of mining rents and 
royalties, according to ex-
traction. 
4. 35% of other import du-
ties, 40% of export du-
ties, 50% of mining rents 
and royalties, and 50% of 
excise duties on tobacco, 
to be paid into the Pool 
Account, and to be dis-
tributed as follows: 50% 
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equally among the 
States, and 50% among 
them according to popu-
lation. 
Source: Phillips 1971, p.394. 
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Table 2:  Vertical allocation of the federation account, 1981-1995 
ITEMS Initial 1981 Act 
(Nullified by 
Supreme 
Court in 
October 1981) 
Revised 1990 January 
1992 
June 1992 
to Date 
NRMAFC 
Proposals 
Proposals of the 
NCC Committee 
on Revenue 
Allocation 
Federal Government 
 
State Government 
 
Local Governments 
Special Funds 
A) Derivation (Oil-
Producing States) 
B) Dev. of Mineral 
Producing Areas 
C) Initial Dev. of FCT. 
Abuja 
D) General Ecological 
Problems 
E) Stabilization 
F) Savings 
G) Other Special Projects 
Subtotal of Special Funds 
55 
 
26.5 
10 
 
2 
 
3 
 
2.5 
1 
 
- 
- 
- 
8.5 
55 
 
30.5 
10 
 
2 
1.5 
 
- 
1 
 
- 
- 
- 
4.5 
50 
 
30 
15 
 
1 
1.5 
 
1 
1 
 
0.5 
- 
- 
5 
 
50 
 
25 
20 
 
1 
1.5 
 
1 
1 
 
0.5 
- 
- 
5 
 
48.5 
 
24 
20 
 
1 
3 
 
1 
2 
 
0.5 
- 
- 
7.5 
47 
 
30 
15 
 
2 
2 
 
1 
0.5 
 
0.5 
2 
- 
8 
33 
 
32.5 
20 
 
- 
6.5 
 
2 
2.5 
 
- 
0.5 
3.0 
14.5 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Suberu, 1995, see New Nigeria, February 26, 1981, also see, National Constitutional Conference Report, 1994, pp. 13, 30. 
Notes:  (a)  The National Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission, inaugurated by General Babangida in  
September, 1988. 
(b) Abuja enjoys the statutory status of a State for revenue sharing purposes and therefore, may partake in the states’  
shares of federal revenues. 
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Table 3: Horizontal revenue allocation formula, 1970-1995 
 Percentage Weight Assigned 
Principles 1970-80 Initial 
1981 Act 
Revised 
1981 Act 
1990 
to 
Date 
Proposals 
of NRMAFC 
Proposals of 
NCC 
Committee 
on Revenue 
Allocation 
Equality of States (Minimum 
responsibility of Government) 
 
Population 
 
Social Development Factor 
 
Internal Revenue Generation Effort 
 
Land mass and/or Terrain 
 
Population Density 
50 
 
50 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
50 
 
40 
 
- 
 
- 
 
10 
 
- 
40 
 
 
40 
 
15 
 
5 
 
- 
 
- 
40 
 
 
30 
 
10 
 
10 
 
10 
 
- 
40 
 
 
30 
 
10 
 
20 
 
- 
 
- 
30 
 
40 
 
- 
 
10 
 
10 
 
10 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source:  New Nigeria, 26th February 1981, National Constitutional Conference Report, 1994, pp. 4 and 30. 
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4. The need for derivation principle 
The most acrimonious issue in Nigeria today involves the increasingly strident 
campaign for economic restitution and ecological rehabilitation by the country’s oil 
producing ethnic minority communities around the Niger Delta Region in the south. 
Since the dramatic expansion in petroleum export revenue in the seventies, Nigeria’s 
revenue sharing policies have explicitly down graded and sometimes eliminated the 
principle of derivation as criteria of entitlement. The principle of derivation in revenue 
allocation has been consciously and systematically obliterated by successive regimes, 
resulting in the drastic reduction of the derivation principle from 100 percent in 1953 to 
50 percent in 1960, 45 percent in 1970, 20 percent in 1975, 2 percent in 1982 to 3 
percent in 1992 till date (see The Source January 18, 1999:18-20, The Guardian on 
Sunday November 15, 1998:17-19). 
However, relatively little official attention has been given to the need to 
compensate the oil bearing arrears for the ecological problems of mineral exploration. 
The concomitant difficulties and problems in the area have been compounded by the 
naturally difficult (usually swampy and creekly) terrain of these areas. The Niger Delta 
area of the country which has today not only placed the country in the sixth position in 
the world’s oil producing chart but has made the country a colossus in Africa and one 
of the most widely reckoned with in the world – as the goose that laid the golden egg – 
has had a reverse fate. It now competes as one of the most wretched communities in 
the world. The people of the entire area have come under serious psychological 
pressure to save their future (Sunday Punch January 17, 1999:9-11).  Despite the fact 
that Nigeria’s mineral resource account for over 80 percent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), 95 percent of national budget and 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings, of 
these figures, 65 percent GDP, 15 percent national budget and 70 percent foreign 
exchange earnings are cumulatively derived from the Niger Delta alone (The Source 
January 18, 1999:18-20). It is pathetic to note that with these huge contributions “… 
their reward from Nigerian state remains avoidable deaths arising from ecological 
devastation and military regression … the unabating damage done to the fragile natural 
environment and to the health of the people is due in the main, to uncontrolled 
exploration of crude oil and natural gas which has led to numerous oil spillage, 
uncontrolled gas flaring, opening up of the forest to loggers, indiscriminate canalization, 
flooding, coastal erosion and earth tremor among others (The Source January 18, 
1999). 
Consequently, there has been an upsurge of economic nationalism in the oil rich 
areas. This has involved rigorous demand for wide-ranging institutional and 
distributional reforms, including the amendment of the Nigerian constitution to make 
mining and minerals a joint federal-state, rather than exclusively federal responsibility. 
The vesting of mineral land rents, and perhaps oil royalties in the communities or state 
of derivation, rather than in the federal government, the payment of significant 
proportion of federally collected petroleum profits tax to the oil producing regions in 
consonance with the principle of derivation; the establishment of appropriate 
institutional and financial arrangements of which the oil rich communities may be 
compensated for, protected against, the ecological problems and risks of oil exploration 
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and exploitation, the establishment of appropriate legislation to compel the state-
backed multi-national oil companies to protect the environmental aspirations of their 
host (oil-bearing) communities, the recasting of Nigeria’s defective federal system 
along genuinely federal, or even confederal line in order to afford greater autonomy 
and security to ethnic minority communities (Suberu 1996 and The Guardian  
November 30, 1992 and April 1, 1994, see also, The News September 14, 1998). 
In the renewed struggle of the oil bearing communities, the Ijaw Elders Forum in a 
newspaper advertorial disclosed that over 50 citizens in numerous villages of their 
communities including the traditional rulers of Kalama and Opia were killed while those 
wounded were over 300 (The Guardian January 15, 1999). This occurred when federal 
government deployed two warships and at least ten armored tanks to quell civil 
disobedience in the areas. The restless communities agreed that it is increasingly 
imperative that the oil companies embark on more community development projects 
such as new towns, provision of electricity, roads and canals etc. in the Niger Delta 
Region of the country. Other specific areas that they believe the multi-national 
corporations exploiting oil in their region should look into immediately include: 
1. Ensure participation of oil producing communities in the operation of oil 
companies with an equity holding of 35 percent. The communities will take 
shares proportionate with their production quota and pay with their land or 
via, specially arranged loan. This state holder approach will go a long way 
in enhancing security of installations within the industry. 
2. Representation at senior management level and at the board by members 
of the oil producing areas. 
3. Employment for Ijaw Youths and that of other oil producing communities 
should be in both quota and merit basis. 
The forum recommended specifically a 40 percent quota allocation based on 
derivation principle for the oil bearing states (The Guardian January 15, 1999:23). It is 
important to note that the 1999 constitution in its section 162 (2) provided that the 
principle of derivation shall be constantly reflected in any approved formula as being 
not less than thirteen per cent of the revenue accruing to the Federation Account 
directly from any natural resources. 
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Concluding remarks 
With the entrenchment of derivation principle in the new constitution, the restless oil 
bearing communities may heave a sigh of relief. But for the stability of the polity, the 
federal government may have to properly monitor the thirteen percent quota allocation 
to them possibly through a special body that may not be akin to the present ineffective 
Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), which has been 
accused on several occasions of corrupt practices. The strongest recommendation of 
this paper is that the thirteen percent derivation quota should be tried and be seen to 
work. However, new thinking in Nigeria now is that even if revenue allocation is 
tinkered with to favour the Oil producing regions of the country, pervasive culture of 
corruption in a kleptocratic polity like Nigeria is indeed making nonsense of innovations. 
In a public lecture, a one time Minister of External Affairs noted that “it has been 
estimated (according to the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime) that 400 billion 
dollar was stolen from the Nigerian Treasury between 1960 and 1999 (Akinyemi 2010). 
The implication is that large chunk of money deployed to the Niger Delta Region for 
development to compensate of oil exploration is far from achieving the desired goals 
more so with a number of former governors in the region fingered in outright plundering 
of their respective states. In essence, the Niger Delta Region of the country is not only 
restless but virtually all integrative mechanisms put in place to guarantee development; 
fairness equity and justice have failed the convoluting Nigerian federation (Ojo 2009). 
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